Abstract|Common security models such as Bell-LaPadula focus on the control of access to sensitive data but leave some important systems issues unspeci ed, such as the implementation of read-only objects, garbage collection, and object upgrade and downgrade paths. Consequently, di erent implementations of the same security model may have con icting operational and security semantics. We propose the use of more expressive security labels for specifying these system issues within the security model, so that the semantics of a system design are precisely understood and are independent of implementation details.
I. Introduction
Multilevel security is a useful model for many commercial and military institutions where the organizations are \naturally" hierarchical and compartmentalized. For example, members of the same management consulting rm who are advising two competitive oil companies should be segregated (the so-called Chinese Wall principle 1]. Also, certain sensitive information is available only to the partners of the rm and not to all employees.
In such a security model, subjects (e.g., user, program, machine) have clearance levels, and objects (e.g., directory, le, device driver) have security levels. There is a binary relationship between the security levels, commonly called \dominate". For example, a user can have a clearance level \secret" and a le can be labelled \top-secret", where the level top-secret dominates (i.e., is more sensitive than) the level secret. The dominating level is also said to be \higher". A subject can read an object if and only if the subject's clearance level dominates the object's security level (the read-down rule), and a subject can write to an object if and only if the subject's clearance level is dominated by the object's security level (the write-up rule) 2], 3]. The dominate relation is typically de ned to be re exive, anti-symmetric, and transitive. This relation, together with the levels, form a partial order or a lattice 4], 5]. One exception is a \trusted" subject that is permitted to perform unusual operations.
These security levels, when attached to objects, are also known as security labels. Here, a security label corresponds to one security level. Although a label can sometimes be expressed by a list of levels, the level of the object to which the label is attached is typically evaluated to the least-upper-bound of the levels in the list 6], for example, when checking access permission. (Level list has also been used for other purposes, such as describing aggregation policies 7] .) The security level of the label itself is usually at the same level as the object or at a lower level. In this paper, a label is classi ed at the lowest level possible, e.g., the level of the subject who creates the object and its label. Such a basic model is primarily focused on data secrecy and does not capture other properties such as data integrity 3]. The model is also simplistic in that some operational aspects of the system are not speci ed and are subject to implementation details 2, Section II]. For example, suppose a high-level object A contains a read reference to a low-level object B. When a low-level subject deletes B, it must not be removed from the system because A still has an interest in B. In fact, B needs to be upgraded and saved at a place that low-level subjects cannot read. One way to achieve this is to make a copy of B, on its deletion, at A's level 8]. Depending on the application, the new object may need to be read-only. As another example, the BellLaPadula model permits object upgrade and downgrade operations by trusted subjects. However, there is no place within the model to specify a path for upgrade or downgrade { that is, one cannot mark a document to the e ect that when it is declassi ed, it should be downgraded rst to a speci c security level.
When the security of an operation depends on implementation details, one bears the risk that di erent implementations may di er in the interpretation of functions such as garbage collection, may not interoperate, and may cause data inconsistency or even security breach. Moreover, each individual implementation must ensure that its own interpretation does not violate security requirement. In our previous example, if a system implementor decides, seemingly quite logically, that object B should be left untouched upon a low-level delete because of A's reference to it, then this implementation violates security because low-level subjects would be able to deduce the (secret) existence of the high-level reference. Therefore, it is much more desirable if such operational aspects can be easily speci ed within the security model itself, so that the semantics of a system design are always precisely understood and are independent of implementation details.
In this paper, we propose to achieve this goal by enriching the expressive power of the security labels. Our method is to allow a security label of an object to be an expression of security levels connected by two new operators. We give axioms for the operators and show that garbage-collection, upgrade or downgrade, and read-only objects can all be easily expressed within this framework. We also show that our access control rules for label expressions conform to the security requirement of the Bell-LaPadula model.
II. Expressive Security Labels
We rst give an informal explanation of the two new operators t and u on security labels. The set of security levels is L0, which together with (the binary relationship \dominate" on L0) form a partial order or a lattice < L0; > 4], 5]. Each subject has a clearance level l 2 L0, and we can de ne the set of security labels L for objects as follows.
The two new operators have the following intended seman-
tics. An object with security label l1 t l2, where l1 l2, is still classi ed at security level l1. Adding the label l2 to an object labelled l1 speci es a potential upgrading path for the object. The interpretation is that subjects at both levels l1 and l2 are interested in the object, and if subjects at the lower level lose interest, the object should be upgraded to the higher level instead of being removed from the system altogether. Thus, for an object labelled l1 t l2, deleting l1 from the label leads to upgrading the object to level l2. When l1 and l2 are incompatible, and suppose that no subject has a security level that is dominated by l1 t l2, then no subject can write to an object labelled l1 t l2. In this case, the object is in e ect a read-only object. Similarly, an object with security label l1 u l2, where l1 l2, is classi ed at security level l2. Adding the label l1 to an object labelled l2 speci es a potential downgrading path for the object. Thus, for an object labelled l1 u l2, deleting l2 from the label leads to downgrading the object to level l1. When l1 and l2 are incompatible, and suppose that no subject has a security level that dominates l1 u l2, then no subject can read an object labelled l1 u l2. In this case, the object is e ectively a write-only object. We will return to read-only and write-only objects in Section III.
A. Axioms
Given the set of security labels L, and l1; l2; l3 2 L, the following axioms govern label operations. The rst four axioms govern the symbolic substitution of label expressions. 
The reason we have not written Axiom 5 as (l1 t l2) = glb(l1; l2) and (l1ul2) = lub(l1; l2) is to avoid confusion because, unlike the previous four axioms, Axiom 5 should not be used for symbolic substitution of label expressions. Axiom 5 implies that the e ective security level of an object, for which an upgrade path has been speci ed, remains low until an upgrade operation is successful. Similarly, the e ective security level of an object, for which a downgrade path has been speci ed, remains high until a downgrade operation is successful. B. Operations on Objects
We rst recall the conditions for typical object operations in Bell-LaPadula type multilevel secure systems. Informally, these rules satisfy the \read-down" and \write-up" principle (also known as the *-property 2], 3]). For a subject at clearance level l1 and an object labelled l2, 1. operation create requires that l1 l2. 2. operation read requires that l2 l1. 3. operation write requires that l1 l2. 4. operation delete requires that l1 l2.
The above operations and conditions, where the object's label is a simple security level, remain the same in our label algebra. Table I summarizes the conditions and consequences of the above operations when the object's label is an expression of security levels. Let l1 <> l2 denote that labels l1 and l2 are incompatible, i.e., l1 6 l2 and l2 6 l1.
The meaning of each operation is easy to understand. For example, for a subject at level l to write to an object labelled l1tl2, the subject must be at a level lower than or equal to both l1 and l2, i.e., l glb(l1; l2). For the subject to delete the object, an obvious condition is that l glb(l1; l2). If l1 l2, then the deletion causes the object to be upgraded to level l2, along the upgrade path given in the original object label. If, however, that l1 and l2 are incompatible, then the object is deleted, unless the operation speci es as its parameter which part of the label is to be removed. Operation up adds an upgrade path to the object label. Similarly, operation down adds a downgrade path. The up operation cannot be performed when levels l1 and l2 are incompatible because otherwise an object previously writable by a subject at level l1 will become readable by a subject at level glb(l1; l2), which represents an insecure downgrade.
C. Security Analysis To show that the new operations de ned in Table I do not violate the \read-down" and \write-up" principle, we need to check each operation to see that it does not cause a write-down either in the object content or in the object label. We need to check also that when a subject's requested operation is not permitted, the denial is not caused by previous actions of a higher-level subject.
Theorem 1: Operations de ned in Table I conform to the \read-down" and \write-up" principle.
Proof: By induction, we only need to prove that all operations are secure on an object with a label l1 t l2 or l1 u l2.
For an object labelled l1 t l2, we can see that the level of a subject that can create or write to the object cannot dominate the level of a subject who can read it. Also, the delete operation is a simple upgrade that does not result in a write-down. Moreover, the up operation can only be invoked by a su ciently low level subject, and that lower-level writes or deletes always succeed independent of actions of higher-level subjects. Thus, all operations are secure.
For an object labelled l1 u l2, there is no write-down in the label because the subject that can create or change the label (e.g., via the down operation) must be trusted. Also, the level of any subject that can read it dominates the level of any subject that can write to or delete it. Moreover, lower-level writes or deletes always succeed. Thus, all operations are secure.
III. Variations, Extensions, and Discussion
Many variations and extensions can be made to the set of operations given in Table I . (We will need special rules for creating read-only objects, but we do not discuss them here.) Because there is no subject with a level that is dominated by l t l 0 , no subject can write to the object. On the other hand, all subjects that can read an object labelled l can also read an object labelled l t l 0 .
Note that < L + fl 0 g; > is a partial order but not a lattice.
In case it has to be a lattice, we can introduce a new bottom element, which is the only element dominated by l 0 and there is no subject with a clearance at the bottom level. Similarly, if we de ne l 00 such that l 00 6 2 L (thus l 00
is not dominated by any other label) and for all l1 2 L, l1 l 00 if and only if l1 l, then an object labelled l u l 00 is write-only. All subjects that can write to an object labelled l can write to an object labelled l u l 00 . Again, special rules for creating write-only objects will be needed, and the introduction of a new top element may be necessary. The de nitions of the delete operations can be easily expanded to take into account these special labels.
To achieve read-only upgrade 8], we only need to add new variants of the delete operation. For example, we can de ne read-only-delete as the following: the conditions for a subject of level l to delete an object with a label l1 t l2 are l glb(l1; l2) and l1 l2. The upgraded object's new label is l2 t l 0 2 . Label deletion that removes an upgrade or downgrade path { the reverse operations of up and down { can be expressed in terms of di erent primitive operations. For example, label l2 in expression l1 t l2 can be deleted by label operation (l1 t l2) u l1, and label l2 in expression l1ul2 can be deleted by label operation (l1 u l2) t l1.
It may be possible to recast our new model with label expressions into a Bell-LaPadula type lattice where each element is a n-tuple. For example, if we restrict a label expression to be a pair of security levels (l1 and l2) joined by either t or u, then an element in the lattice has one of the following three forms: < l1; null; null >, < l1; l2; t >, or < l1; l2; u >. New operations on this lattice of n-tuples can be de ned to capture the object and label operations already given in this paper. When n increases, the resulting lattice can become very large and complicated, thus an interesting task is to nd the minimum lattice to express a set of given operations.
This lattice di ers from our current one in that a subject's clearance can be an expression of security levels. This feature can capture interesting security properties, such as the Chinese Wall policy 1]. Informally, data regarding two competing companies are stored at level l1 and level l2, respectively, where l1 <> l2. A subject (e.g., a management consultant) who before being commissioned can potentially read objects at either level l1 or level l2 but not both, has a security clearance l1 t l2. The rst time the consultant gains read access to level l1, his clearance is automatically updated to (l1 t l2) u l1 = l1 (see Axiom 4(b)), and he is thus excluded from read access to level l2 in the future, for con ict of interest.
In our current model, there is no need to hide the content of an object label, because subjects that create or modify labels are either trusted or of su ciently low clearance levels. In particular, a subject that is permitted to read the content of an object is also permitted to read its label. It is possible to implement ltering operations on object (or subject) labels such that di erent subjects are restricted to seeing only (and di erent) parts of a label expression. With this ltering technique, an object label can embed a high-level reference to a low-level object without revealing the reference to low-level subjects. This functionality has been previously implemented using a lower-level technique 8].
Finally, there are more multilevel and non-multilevel security properties that our approach appears capable of capturing, possibly with the introduction of additional label operators. For example, the high-water-mark model 3] potentially can be expressed with an upgrade path. It will be useful to know the limit of our new approach { for example, what kind of object operations and constraints (e.g., those in the Biba integrity model 3]) can or cannot be captured with reasonably simple but expressive labels.
